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7.1 Main findings 
All of the previous chapters and epilogues have contributed to answering the main 
research question: 
Are legislative measures concerning traffic laws and civil liability needed in order to 
facilitate the deployment of self-driving cars on public roads within the EU, and if so, 
which legislative measures concerning traffic laws and civil liability should be taken? 
The various chapters have revealed shortcomings in accommodating automated 
driving in both traffic law and civil liability. In addition, the preferred solutions for 
these shortcomings and the necessary steps to implement the solution have been 
proposed. 
7.1.1 The Geneva Convention and Vienna Convention Are Not Compatible With 
Automated Driving 
The notion of driver within both the 1949 Geneva Convention on Road Traffic and the 
1968 Vienna Convention on Road Traffic does not accommodate automated driving 
(section 3.3.2). Driver, within the meaning of the Conventions, is a human who 
decides on the speed and direction of a vehicle by operating (some of) the controls of 
the vehicle (section 3.2.4). Therefore, an SAE Level 5 vehicle is driverless within the 
meaning of the Conventions. The preferred approach to overcome this problem is the 
functioneel daderschap approach (freely translated: vicarious perpetrator approach, 
section 3.8). This approach entails that the automated driving system drives the 
automated vehicle, and the acts of the automated driving system are regarded as 
being the acts of the (legal) person who has the power to dispose over the conduct of 
the automated driving system. The functioneel daderschap approach requires only 
one amendment to be made to each of the Conventions: the definition of driver 
needs to be deleted (art. 4 paragraph 1 Geneva Convention, art. 1(v) of the Vienna 
Convention). This can be done via the amendment procedures of both Conventions 
(art. 31 Geneva Convention, art. 49 Vienna Convention), whereby one of the 
Contracting Parties can propose an amendment. The traffic rules directed at the 
driver can remain as they are. If the amendment is accepted and therefore the 
definition of driver is deleted, the functioneel daderschap approach further enables a 
flexible interpretation of the notion of driver in both Conventions. Depending on the 
exact circumstances, a driver can be the automated driving system or a human (in 
case of a conventional vehicle). The driver can even change, for instance, in an SAE 
Level 4 vehicle where the driving task is performed by the automated driving system 
during part of the trip, and by a human during the other part. This also illustrates that 
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the functioneel daderschap approach is suitable for a future where vehicles of 
different levels of automation share the road. In addition, the fuctioneel daderschap 
approach offers a clear framework on responsibility for the conduct of the vehicle. 
7.1.2 Software should be a Product within the Meaning of the EU Product 
Liability Directive 
Another legal instrument that is challenged by the development of automated 
vehicles is, as discussed in Chapter 5, the Product Liability Directive (Directive 
85/374/EEC). An important discussion point in literature is whether software should 
be regarded to be a product within the meaning of art. 2 of the Directive (section 
5.5). If software is being regarded as a product, then the producer of a software 
update for the automated vehicle can be held liable for damage caused by a defective 
software update. This is in line with the level of consumer protection offered by the 
Product Liability Directive.1 The EU Court of Justice will need to decide on the status 
of software under the Product Liability Directive. Whether software is a product 
within the meaning of the Directive is a matter of interpretation, as it does not 
require any changes to the Directive itself. 
7.1.3 Two Defences of the Producer Lead To Undesirable Results 
Two of the defences that the Product Liability Directive offers to the producer lead to 
undesirable results when applied to scenarios related to automated driving. The 
outcomes are not in line with the level of consumer protection offered by the 
Directive. 
The defence of art. 7(b) of the Product Liability Directive could lead to an undesirable 
result when applied to a situation such as when an automated vehicle gets a software 
update from the producer of the automated vehicle (long) after the vehicle has been 
put into circulation (section 5.7.1). The software update could turn out to be 
defective, when it causes damage. In this scenario, the producer of the automated 
vehicle could avoid liability by invoking the defence of art. 7(b) of the Directive: 
“having regard to the circumstances, it is probable that the defect which caused the 
damage did not exist at the time when the product was put into circulation by him or 
that this defect came into being afterwards (…).” Subsequently, the injured party 
would not be compensated for their damage and – depending on national tort law – 
and could be left without compensation entirely. This is not acceptable as this 
outcome is not in line with the Product Liability Directive’s aim of ensuring consumer 
 
 
1 Recitals Product Liability Directive. 
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protection. To achieve this aim of consumer protection, the defence of art. 7(b) of 
the Directive should be interpreted in line with its rationale. This means that as long 
as a producer can exercise (substantial) influence over his product, as is the case with 
software updates, the producer should not be able to successfully invoke the defence 
of art. 7(b) of the Product Liability Directive. 
The defence of art. 7(e) of the Product Liability Directive, the development risk 
defence, also leads to undesirable results in the context of automated driving (section 
5.7.2). If the producer successfully invokes the development risk defence, then the 
development risk of the automated vehicle is put onto the shoulders of the random 
road users injured by the automated vehicle. As the development of automated 
vehicles should benefit society as a whole, it is not acceptable that a random victim 
carries the burden of the development risk. Therefore, Members States should 
derogate from the development risk defence of art. 7(e) of the Product Liability 
Directive. Article 15(1)(b) of the Directive offers Members States this possibility. This 
requires legislative measures by the individual Member States.2 
7.1.4 The Influence Of The (Type-)approval Of A Vehicle On Liability Risks Will 
Increase 
In this day and age of conventional vehicles, the (type-)approval of a (type of) vehicle 
has very limited, if any, influence on the liability risks of the stakeholders involved. 
This will change with the development of automated vehicles. Where the liability of 
stakeholders is affected by the justified expectations of users, the (type-)approval will 
have an increased influence on the liability risks of those stakeholders. This is 
because the (type-)approval shapes the justified expectations of the users, as shown 
in section 5.6 for the producer and section 6.3.3 for the road authority. The (type-
)approval sets expectations for the functioning of the vehicle itself, when it has been 
approved for use on certain roads and under certain conditions. For instance, if the 
automated vehicle is approved for use during rain, this raises the justified expectation 
of the user that the vehicle is capable of driving fully automated during rain without a 
problem. If the automated vehicle then causes damage, it does not meet the justified 
expectations, which can contribute towards establishing whether the automated 
vehicle is a defective product within the meaning of art. 6 of the Product Liability 
Directive (section 5.6). Thereby, the (type-)approval influences the liability risks of the 
producer of the automated vehicle. The (type-)approval has not this great an 
 
 
2 After the completion of this thesis, the European Commission published the report ‘Liability for Artificial 
Intelligence and other emerging digital technologies’, written by the Expert Group on Liability and New 
Technologies - New Technologies Formation. This report underlines the findings of this thesis. 
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influence when it comes to conventional vehicles, as this would not entail the 
conditions (weather, roads, etc) under which the conventional vehicle can function. 
Besides, a conventional vehicle has a human driver that should act in unsafe 
conditions. Consequently, the (type-)approval of a conventional vehicle does not 
shape the expectations of the users to the extent the (type-)approval of an 
automated vehicle does. The increased influence of the (type-)approval of automated 
vehicles on the liability risks of the producer are illustrated by Table 1 and Table 2, 
where Table 1 shows the situation for the producer of a conventional vehicle and 
Table 2 the situation for the producer of an automated vehicle. 
Table 1. Circumstances that can be taken into account when establishing whether a 






Table 2. Circumstances that can be taken into account when establishing whether an 
automated vehicle is defective within the meaning of art. 6 of the Product Liability Directive. 
The influence of the (type-)approval is also relevant for the liability risks of the road 
authority, as the (type-)approval can also set expectations for the conditions of the 
infrastructure for which the vehicle has been approved, for instance, the state of 
maintenance of the road. If the vehicle is approved for use on a specific kind of road, 
this gives rise to the expectation that the road fulfils the requirements for the 
approved automated vehicle to function. If the road does not meet these 
expectations, and consequently the vehicle causes damage, then the road authority 
can be held liable if the justified expectations of the user of the vehicle play a part in 
establishing liability (as it does in the Netherlands, see section 6.3). 
This illustrates how the liability risks of stakeholders, like the producer and the road 
authority, are influenced by the (type-)approval. This is a new development evoked 
by the development of automated vehicles. In addition, like with the (type-)approval 
of conventional vehicles, the vehicle authority could, depending on national tort law, 
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be held liable for wrongly approving a vehicle. The influence of the (type-)approval on 
the liability risks of different stakeholders is illustrated by Table 3. 
Table 3. The relationship between the technical regulations, the (type-)approval and the 
liability risks of the stakeholders discussed in this thesis. 
7.2 Additional Findings 
This research has also resulted in several additional findings. It brought to light the 
increased impact of the (type-)approval of automated vehicles on the liability risks of 
the stakeholders involved in automated driving, notably the producer (Chapter 5) and 
the road authority by means of a Dutch example (Chapter 6). In addition, the (type-
)approval can also be seen as a tool to provide clarity on the roles of the stakeholders 
involved in automated driving. A sort of ‘liability by design’ could be achieved by 
laying down technical requirements that need to be met in order to be awarded the 
(type-)approval, that take away any discussions on the roles of stakeholders in 
liability questions (Epilogue to Chapter 6). For instance, by requiring an SAE Level 5 
not to have a steering wheel, the user of the vehicle cannot interfere with the driving, 
thereby avoiding questions on who did what with regards to the steering of the 
vehicle in the moments before an accident.  
In addition, a ‘liability impact assessment’ is advisable (Epilogue to Chapter 6). This 
‘liability impact assessment’ should be done by governments in order to provide 
clarity on the liability risks of all of the stakeholders involved in automated driving, 
including governmental bodies. This approach is based on the data protection impact 
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assessment from the GDPR, which entails an assessment of the impact of the 
envisaged processing operations on the protection of personal data. A liability impact 
assessment should provide clarity on the liability risks of the stakeholders and 
thereby on the risks that should be insured. 
In the context of insurance, the notion of driver needs clarification (Epilogue to 
Chapter 3). Given art. 12 (1) of the EU Motor Insurance Directive, the mandatory 
motor vehicle insurance should cover liability for personal injuries to all passengers, 
but not the driver, arising out of the use of a vehicle. So, the notion of driver is not 
only of importance for the Geneva Convention and Vienna Convention, but also for 
the Motor Insurance Directive. If the user is the driver of the automated vehicle 
within the meaning of this Directive, then the user will not get their damage 
compensated. 
7.3 Further Research: The Road Ahead 
This research has shown the legislative steps concerning the 1949 Geneva Convention 
on Road Traffic, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Traffic, and the Product 
Liability Directive that need to be taken in order to accommodate automated driving 
and to provide desirable outcomes in the context of automated driving. Furthermore, 
the influence of the (type-)approval3 on the liability risks should not be 
underestimated. Using approaches based on the General Data Protection 
Regulation’s data protection impact assessment and privacy by design, the liability 
risks of the different stakeholders should be investigated and these risks should also 
be influenced through privacy by design, via the technical requirements automated 
vehicles need to meet in order to be (type-)approved. By implementing the discussed 
actions and approaches, the Geneva Convention, Vienna Convention and the Product 
Liability Directive will provide for a future with automated driving. There is, however, 
the need for further research. 
In this thesis, the notion of driver in the context of the 1949 Geneva Convention on 
Road Traffic and the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Traffic was studied. There is, in 
addition, a need to study the notion of driver in the context of insurance, more 
specifically the definition of driver in the EU Motor Insurance Directive. Moreover, 
whether a different system of insurance would lead to a more desirable result in 
regards to automated driving needs further research. First-party insurance, instead of 
third-party insurance, could avoid confronting the injured party with the question of 
 
 
3 Directive 2007/46/EC. 
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who is liable for the damage caused by an automated vehicle. The UK Automated and 
Electric Vehicles Act of 2018 underlines this need to explore first-party insurance and 
other systems of insurance for automated vehicles. 4 
Likewise, more research in the field of tort law is necessary. This thesis has focused 
on SAE Level 5 vehicles, whereas SAE Level 3 and 4 also pose challenges for liability 
regimes. Specifically, the situation in which the automated vehicle warns the (then) 
user to take over the driving tasks as an event which is unmanageable for the 
automated driving system nears, poses a challenge. When does the liability shift from 
the producer to the user/driver of the vehicle? Is this the moment the take-over 
request is issued, when the user puts their hands on the wheel and becomes the 
driver, or was the use of the automated system from the start at the user’s risk? 
Furthermore, if it turns out that automated vehicles will depend on communication 
with the infrastructure, so-called V2I communication, or with other vehicles, so-called 
V2V communication, questions arise on the liability for damage caused by the latency 
of the communication network or the information that is provided. 
In addition, the research on the (type-)approval should continue. This research 
brought to light the importance of the (type-)approval in tort law. Further research is 
needed to explore the feasibility and desirability of the (type-)approval as a tool to 
achieve ‘liability by design’. Also, the outcome in the discussion on moral dilemmas – 
who to save in case of an unavoidable accident – could lead to new requirements 
being set in order for vehicles to be awarded a (type-)approval.5 For instance, 
approval of a vehicle could be denied if the vehicle is programmed to always save its 
passengers if it is determined, following the results of the ongoing ethical discussions 
or given a determination from the government, that it is undesirable for it to do so. 
These new requirements based on the outcomes of the discussions on moral 
dilemmas could very well differ per country, as research has shown variations in 




4 See more extensively Chapter 2. 
5 See for instance Independent High-Level Expert group on Artificial Intelligence set up by the 
European Commission, ‘Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI’ (8 April 2019); Ethik-Kommission, 
‘Automatisiertes und Vernetztes Fahren’ (Bericht eingesetzt durch den Bundesminister für Verkehr 
und digitale Infrastruktur, Juni 2017); ‘MIT Moral Machine’ <http://moralmachine.mit.edu/> 
accessed 14 August 2019; Edmond Awad and others, ‘The Moral Machine experiment’ (2018) 563 
Nature volume 59. 
6 Edmond Awad and others, ‘The Moral Machine experiment’ (2018) 563 Nature volume 59. 
